At the height of this propaganda offensive, I appeared on CNN International with correspondent Michael Ware. We were seen live in Baghdad. Deflating enemy claims, I dismissed Juba as a myth and pointed out the propaganda misrepresentations in insurgent videos. Two days later, upset by my comments, the al-Qaeda sniper chief in Baghdad appeared on Al Jazeera to mock me by name and boast of his snipers’ achievements. Not long after the sniper chief uttered my name, I was invited by the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Office to a counter-sniping conference at the Pentagon where we discussed strategies and techniques to defeat the insurgent snipers. Analyzing dozens of enemy sniping videos, I’d determined that virtually all the engagements were at ground level, rarely more than 150 yards, and that most insurgent shooters were aboard vehicles, “hiding” in background clutter across busy streets, intersections and traffic circles. In almost every instance, I noted, the G.I. victims were targets of opportunity at Traffic Control Points or near halted American vehicles, and they lacked optics suitable for spotting their attackers. Already, much was being done to counter sniper attacks. Fort Meade’s Asymmetric Warfare Group prepared an excellent sniper awareness brochure to distribute in Iraq. Along with other experts, I urged the widespread distribution of optics among deployed units to better detect sniper vehicles before they fired, and a counter-tactic of not waiting for a reaction force, but immediately and aggressively rushing any sniper who fired at American forces, whether with four men or 400.
Countering Al-Qaeda’s Gunmen American technology responded, too, with an effective sniper bullet detection system called Boomerang. Mounted in a Humvee, this computer-linked acoustic sensor separated the signature of a passing bullet from background noise and tracked it to its related muzzle blast. The system’s computerized voice then announced, for example, “Rifle shot, 239 meters, 2 o’clock.” By 2007, some 4,000 Boomerang systems had deployed to Iraq, with another 4,000 destined for there and Afghanistan. Both the Army and Marine Corps increased their sniper slots and expanded their sniper schools, calling upon veteran snipers to instruct the students. Thousands of M14 rifles were removed from storage, accurized and topped with scopes to outfit platoon-level designated marksmen. Even at squad-level, the services added a Squad Designated Marksman, arming him with a specially accurized M16 and optical sight. Deploying units received realistic counter-sniper training while Iraq-bound snipers attended short shooting clinics. (I instructed one such preparatory course at Fort Hood, Texas, for the fine young snipers of the Army’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.) Thus, thousands of additional guardian angels with rifles arrived in Iraq to support their units and add more scoped rifles to the nationwide sniper hunt. In a classic case, a 1st Cavalry Division sniper, Staff Sgt. Jeff Young, exploited the sun’s shifting rays to pinpoint a hidden Iraqi sniper. “We got lucky when the sun was going down,” he told Stars and Stripes. “It hit his scope at the right angle and we got a glare in our direction so we engaged it.” Another Army sniper, Sgt. Randall Davis, twice defeated opposing snipers, engaging them from a rooftop in Samarra. Firing an accurized M14 rifle, he patiently out-waited an Iraqi sniper who had fired upon Americans three days earlier. When the Iraqi reappeared, Davis’ keen eyes picked him out. Davis eliminated another Iraqi sniper with a 750-yard shot with a Barrett .50-cal. rifle. Some snipers defeated enemy snipers well beyond their “book” maximum range. U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Jim Gilliland scored the longest counter-sniper engagement in Iraq with a 7.62x51 mm NATO rifle. When Gilliland and his spotter, Sgt. Bryan Pruett, learned an insurgent sniper had shot a fellow G.I., they focused their optics on a hospital a dozen blocks away. Detecting the insurgent in a window, the distance was so great
|
|
||||||
|
|









Comments
ADD YOUR COMMENT
Enter your comments below, they will appear within 24 hours
7 Responses to Winning the Sniper War in Iraq (Page 2)